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Constitutional Revision: Are Seriatim
Amendments or Constitutional Conventions
the Better Way to Amend a State
Constitution?
Ann M. Lousin*
The fifty American states may amend their constitutions in two
ways. First, the states can submit individual amendments to the voters.
Usually, the legislature drafts each amendment, adopts it, and submits it
to the voters for their approval. In those states that allow the initiative
process, a group of voters sign a petition containing the proposed
constitutional language and, if they obtain enough signatures, the state
government submits the amendment to all of the voters for their
approval. Second, the states can hold a constitutional convention to
consider revisions of the constitution on either a limited or plenary basis.
Which method is better? In my forty years of researching Illinois
constitutional issues and observing other states, I have learned that there
are advantages and disadvantages to each method. Sometimes I
recommend the first choice, serial amendments, and sometimes I
recommend the second choice, a convention.
There are three key points to consider in choosing a method of state
constitutional amendment. The first point is that the voting public
invariably has the final say on whether the proposed language will
become part of the state constitution. This is true for both the seriatim
amendment method and the constitutional convention method. This
means that the important political players, parties, and operatives must be
reasonably content with the proposal. Strong opposition from any one
faction will strengthen the hand of those who oppose any change in the
constitution. The consequent combined opposition will often doom the
proposed amendment or the proposed call for a convention. I believe
this is the reason that most constitutional revision in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries has been relatively conservative. Truly bold moves
are certain to arouse suspicion and opposition from people or groups who
feel threatened by major changes.
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In recent decades, the campaigns for and against proposed revisions
have become the bailiwick of professional political operatives who use
computers, targeted lists, and political action groups organized under
Sec. 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. They operate on a level of
sophistication unimaginable when most state constitutions were drafted.
(I include the Illinois constitution of 1970 in that statement because
nobody at the 1969-1970 Illinois constitutional convention could have
envisioned the way computers would change all elections and referenda.)
Many of these political operatives are based in California, which has
more statutory and constitutional referenda than any state. However,
proponents and opponents of constitutional amendments everywhere
often retain these organizations' services.
The second point is that legislatures are suspicious of constitutional
conventions, seeing them as rival legislative bodies. This suspicion is
rooted deeply in American constitutional history. The Congress
organized under the Articles of Confederation authorized the calling of
the 1787 Constitutional Convention, whose work product effectively
abolished that Congress upon ratification by the states. Ever since then,
legislatures have been wary of constitutional conventions. Unless a
convention is "loaded" with delegates who are also legislators or have
been legislators recently, the legislatures fear that the convention will
propose revisions that will diminish the powers of the legislative branch.
There is an inherent rivalry between the two bodies.
Legislators know they must account to their constituents for their
votes when they run for re-election. Constitutional conventions, by
contrast, are one-time events. I liken them to the mythical village of
Brigadoon in the eponymous musical: they appear for day (really a few
months), do what they do, and then disappear into the mists. The
delegates to a convention seek to have their work product adopted, but
they do not have to run for re-election to their posts.
The third point is that legislatures are reluctant to propose any
serial amendments that restrict the powers of the legislative branch. In
fact, no branch of government, whether it is the legislative, executive, or
judicial branch, thinks its powers should be reduced. The 1970 Illinois
Constitutional Convention knew this. Therefore, it created a limited
initiative and referendum procedure for certain basic parts of the article
on the legislature. Although the convention record lists several examples
of parts of the legislative article that could be amended by the initiative
and referendum "bypass procedure," only one procedure was truly
paramount in the delegates' minds. This procedure was to change the
method of electing members of the Illinois House of Representatives
through a system unique to Illinois: multi-member districts elected by
cumulative voting. Many delegates at the convention and some other
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Illinoisans wanted to switch to the more traditional American system of
single member districts with "first past the post" voting.
The method of electing the Illinois House of Representatives was
one of the most-hotly-debated issues at the convention. At various times,
especially towards the end of the convention, there was a real danger that
the convention might break apart over this issue. In the end, cooler and
cleverer heads prevailed.
The method of electing the Illinois House was one of four
controversial, but discrete, issues at the convention. The other three were
1) changing from electing state judges to appointing them; 2) abolition of
the death penalty; 3) and lowering the voting age from twenty-one to
eighteen. These four issues became "separate submissions." The voters
were thus given five choices at the referendum: should the proposed new
constitution be adopted and then, if adopted, should any of these four
proposals submitted separately also be adopted? The decision to submit
the proposed constitution along with the four separate submissions gave
the proponents of the main document a great advantage: those who
wanted a change from the current order, i.e., wanted to abolish the death
penalty, wanted to lower the voting age, wanted to have judges appointed
rather than elected, or wanted to have the Illinois House elected by single
member districts also had to campaign to have the main document
approved by the voters.
In effect, the 1970 referendum combined the most advantageous
aspects of the seriatim amendment process and the constitutional
convention process. The convention submitted a complex "proposed
constitution" and then four discrete issues, each of which could stand or
fall on its own.
The voters adopted the proposed constitution at the referendum held
December 15, 1970. However, they also voted at that time on the four
separately-submitted issues. They voted to adopt the new constitution,
but to retain the status quo regarding the four separate issues. They
chose to keep the basic method of electing members of the Illinois
House; to continue electing judges, instead of appointing them; to reject
a constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and to retain the voting
age at twenty-one. The voters' decisions on these four issues had no
effect at all upon the content of the proposed constitution they adopted.
Since the new constitution became effective on July 1, 1971, there
have been several attempts to amend it. In the end, Illinois voters have
had twenty-one opportunities to vote on state constitutional issues at
referenda.
Two of the twenty issues voted upon were whether to call new
constitutional conventions. The Illinois constitution requires submission
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of a "call for a convention" every twenty years.' In 1988 and again in
2008 the issue automatically appeared on the ballot. The first time, in
1988, the proponents of a call found it difficult to convince the voters
that Illinois should hold another convention only twenty years after the
previous one. Those who wanted an appointive system of judges
combined forces with a citizens' group led by our now-incumbent
Governor, Pat Quinn. Quinn's group advocated "citizens' initiatives" for
legislation and constitutional amendments. The voters turned the call
2down by a vote of three to one.
The second time, in 2008, the proponents were totally unorganized
and advocated positions ranging from the extreme right, akin to the
current Tea Party movement, to the extreme left, who wanted massive
tax restructuring and "returning power to the people." The only major
public official who publicly and strongly supported the call was again
Quinn, who by this time was the Lieutenant Governor of Illinois. Quinn
repeated his populist agenda, but added "reform of legislative
procedures" that would diminish the powers of the legislative leaders. At
one point he advocated a state constitutional convention "to combat
3
global warming." The voters rejected the call by a vote of two to one.
Proponents could not carry even a single county.
Of the remaining nineteen referenda on the state constitution, all but
one were seriatim amendments submitted by the legislature. That one
exception was the Cutback Amendment of 1980, which reduced the size
of the Illinois House by one-third and, much more importantly, abolished
the multi-member district system with cumulative voting in favor of a
single member district system.4 The chief proponents of the Cutback
Amendment of 1980 were Pat Quinn, then a professional activist, and the
League of Women Voters of Illinois, which has long espoused single
member districts.
Obviously, there was no chance that the Illinois House would vote
to propose any change in the system by which the incumbents were
elected. Only the limited citizens' initiative could accomplish that.
Quinn and the League circulated the petitions and ran a successful
campaign for adoption. Quinn's argument to the voters emphasized that
it would "get rid of a third" of the House in order to save money; there
was little emphasis upon the elimination of multi-member districts with
cumulative voting. Without question, adoption of the Cutback
1. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1(b).
2. Of the 4,697,192 votes cast on whether to call a constitutional convention in
1988, there were 900,109 "for" votes and 2,727,144 "against" votes.
3. Of the 5,539,172 votes cast on whether to call a constitutional convention in
2008, there were 1,493,203 "for" votes and 3,062,724 "against" votes.
4. See chart at the end of this essay.
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Amendment has had more impact than any of the other ten amendments
adopted. Most observers think it increased the power of the four
legislative leaders over rank-and-file members and that it reduced the
influence of minority party voters in most legislative districts.
The legislature drafted and submitted the remaining ten
amendments adopted over the years. Most are noncontroversial. Only
three are really worth describing here.
The first is the 1994 amendment to the "Effective date of laws"
section.5  Formerly, the legislature needed the approval of only a
majority of the members elected to each chamber to pass a bill by June
30 th of any year, but any bill passed after that date that was to become
effective before January 1St of the next year needed approval by three-
fifths of each chamber.6
This so-called "Effective date of laws" provision had the greatest
impact upon adoption of the annual state budget. It is rare that either
political party has a majority of three-fifths in either chamber, let alone
in both chambers. Yet, after that "effective date," proponents of a bill
must muster three-fifths of those elected to each chamber in order to pass
a bill that would become effective before January 1s of the next year.
Clearly, the state budget must become effective on or shortly after July
Is of each year, six months before the next January 1st. Consequently,
the minority party in only one of the chambers gains great power if the
state budget is not passed by the "effective date."
In 1994 the legislature proposed and the voters adopted an
amendment pushing that "effective date" up from June 30'" to May 3 1 st8
After midnight on May 31s', the "majority party" in each chamber must
corral votes from "across the aisle" in order to keep state government
functioning. This situation raises the spectre of California, which has
found a state budget almost impossible to pass because since 1933, two-
thirds of each chamber must approve the state budget. Illinois began
moving in that direction in 1994, with sad repercussions. That
5. See chart at the end of this essay.
6. Article IV, Section 10 of the Illinois constitution provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective date for
laws passed prior to June 1 of a calendar year. The General Assembly may
provide for a different effective date in any law passed prior to June 1. A bill
passed after May 31 shall not become effective prior to June 1 of the next
calendar year unless the General Assembly by the vote of three-fifths of the
members elected to each house provides for an earlier effective date.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 10. Before adoption of the 1994 amendment, "June l" was "July
1," and "May 3 1" was "June 30." The "general effective date" has long been January I
of the year after passage by the General Assembly. See Ann M. Lousin, THE ILLINOIS
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 111-113 (2009).
7. Id.
8. See chart at the end of this essay.
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amendment is one reason that Illinois is fast going down California's
road to fiscal disaster.
The second significant amendment is the 1998 amendment to the
judicial article.9 It amended the judicial discipline system in several
ways. The 1998 amendment's major purpose was to involve more non-
judges in the process of judicial discipline. So far, the "citizen members"
of the Illinois Courts Commission, of whom I was one from 2001 to
2003, do not seem to have been the crucial votes in judicial discipline
matters. However, there is now a greater appearance of fairness and less
of an appearance of decisions made by an "old boys' club."
The third significant amendment is the 2010 amendment providing
for recall of the Governor.o It is clearly a response to the most recent
scandal in the governorship, which resulted in Governor Rod
Blagojevich's being impeached and removed from office in January,
2009. Although the Illinois constitution provided a way for the
legislature to remove a Governor deemed guilty of gross malfeasance in
office," some Illinoisans thought that there should also be a way for the
voters to remove a Governor. The recall system proposed by the General
Assembly requires signatures by Senators and Representatives from both
major parties on a petition, which would also be signed by a large
number of voters, to submit the issue of recall to the electorate.12 In
effect, the Illinois gubernatorial recall system requires the consent of
both the legislature and thousands of voters just to initiate the recall
drive.
Although the recall procedure is so new that Illinois has no
experience with it yet, it is clearly a method by which the legislature can
pressure the Governor. Legislators can tell the Governor that if he
consistently countermands their wishes, they will sign the papers
allowing voters to petition for his recall. Although it would be very
difficult for a recall drive to succeed, the Governor under attack would
be forced to devote significant time and energy to defending himself.
The Illinois voters have refused to give seven legislatively-proposed
seriatim amendments the 60% approval they need for adoption.13
However, of these seven, five garnered a majority of the votes cast on the
issue. In short, if Illinois required only 50% plus one to adopt a
9. See chart at the end of this essay.
10. See chart at the end of this essay.
11. The Illinois Constitution provides for the impeachment and removal of various
officers of state government, including the Governor. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14. On
January 29, 2009, the Illinois Senate voted to remove Governor Rod R. Blagojevich from
his office after the Illinois House impeached him a few weeks earlier. That is the only
impeachment and removal of a Governor in Illinois history.
12. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 7.
13. See chart at the end of this essay.
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constitutional amendment, we would have had fifteen amendments, not
just eleven, to the 1970 Illinois constitution. Of the proposed
amendments that failed to be ratified, the most important was probably
the 1992 amendment on education funding.14 This amendment would
have required the legislature to establish a minimum level of dollars that
the State must contribute to the funding of each child in a public school.
Although just over 57% of the voters approved it, it failed to obtain the
60% necessary for adoption. (Full disclosure: I voted against it.)
The history of the campaigns for and against the 1992 "Educational
funding amendment" shows how difficult it is to adopt an amendment
submitted seriatim. Virtually every major player in Illinois public life
advocates greater state support of the elementary and secondary public
schools. Likewise, virtually every major player advocates "equality of
funding." But when it comes to facing the issue directly, there is
pushback. All of those who pay high property taxes to support their local
schools, all of those who send their children to non-public schools, and
all of those who are not certain that increasing funding will increase
educational quality joined forces to oppose the amendment. Even some
of the Illinoisans who told me they voted for it admitted that they did so
to "send a message," not because they really wanted to have the
legislature set an equal contribution of State funding to the schools.
For issues as complex as the funding of public education, with the
ramifications of state versus local control, the relative burden between
state taxation and local property taxes, and the compromises needed to
satisfy the parents of students in non-public schools, a constitutional
convention is a more appropriate method of constitutional revision.
School funding is not really a discrete issue that can easily be addressed
by one up or down vote.
I have attached a chart on the Illinois experience with constitutional
referenda submitted on twenty-one occasions. Perhaps you will come to
different conclusions, but I think submitting amendments seriatim is
better when the voters can truly focus upon a discrete issue and can make
an intelligent judgment upon it without considering other factors. I also
think that when issues are undeniably complex, as education funding is,
the better way to address them is a constitutional convention. At a
convention the various players can be heard more easily and the
necessary compromises can be made. Perhaps most importantly, the
members of the convention will not have to stand for re-election.
14. See chart at the end of this essay.
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CHART ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDA SINCE 197015
Automatic Calls for a Constitutional Convention (60% approval needed)
1988 Approve: 24.82%; Disapprove: 75.18%FAILED
2008 Approve: 32.77%; Disapprove: 67.23% FAILED
Amendments Approved by the Voters (60% approval needed)
1980 The Cutback Amendment, proposed by the citizens' initiative
provision of Article XIV, Section 3, which reduced the size of House of
Representatives from 177 to 118 and substituted single member districts
for districts having three members elected by cumulative voting.
Approve: 68.70%; Disapprove: 31.30%PASSED
1980 Amendment to Article IX, Section 8 on sales of property for
delinquent taxes. Approve: 69.94%; Disapprove: 30.06% PASSED
1982 Amendment to Article I, Section 9 limiting the right to bail.
Approve: 85.31%; Disapprove: 14.69% PASSED (N.B.: This was
apparently a response to the legislature's removing the death penalty
from several crimes for which it could have been applicable before;
Illinois allows bail for non-death penalty offenses.)
1986 Amendment to Article I, Section 9 limiting the right to bail
and habeas corpus. Approve: 77.25%; Disapprove: 22.75% PASSED
1988 Amendment to Article III, Section 1 to conform voting
eligibility requirements to federal standards. Approve: 64.23%;
Disapprove: 35.77% (N.B.: disapproval would have had no practical
effect whatsoever.) PASSED
1990 Amendment to Article IX, Section 8 on sales of property for
delinquent taxes. Approve: 72.25%; Disapprove: 27.75% PASSED
1992 Amendment adding Section 8.1 to Article I on rights of
victims of crimes. Approve: 80.56%; Disapprove: 19.44% PASSED
15. The text of each amendment and further information can be found at various




1994 Amendment to Article I, Section 8 rights after indictment,
notably the right to confront witnesses. Approve: 62.73%; Disapprove:
37.27% PASSED
1994 Amendment to Article IV, Section 10 effective date of laws.
Approve: 68.87%; Disapprove: 31.13% PASSED
1998 Amendment to Article VI, Section 15 regarding judicial
discipline, notably composition of the Illinois Courts Commission.
Approve: 80.47%; Disapprove: 19.53% PASSED
2010 Amendment to Article III, adding Section 7 regarding
gubernatorial recall. Approve: 67.69%; Disapprove: 34.31% PASSED
Amendments Rejected by the Voters (60% approval needed)
1974 Amendment to Article IV, Section 9 limiting the
gubernatorial amendatory veto. Approve: 49.48%; Disapprove: 50.52%
FAILED
1978 Amendment to Article IX, Section 5 removing the projected
constitutional abolition of the ad valorem personal property tax on
individuals. Approve: 56.48%; Disapprove: 43.52% FAILED
1978 Amendment to Article IX, Section 6
organizations' posts from real property taxes.
Disapprove: 51.89% FAILED
1984 Amendment to Article LX, Section 6
organizations' posts from real property taxes.
Disapprove: 47.59% FAILED
1986 Amendment to Article IX, Section 6








1988 Amendment to Article IX, Section 8 on sales of property for
delinquent taxes. Approve: 59.13%; Disapprove: 40.87% FAILED
1992 Amendment to Article X, Section I to require a legislatively-
established minimum contribution of state aid per child in public
elementary and secondary schools. Approve: 57.05%; Disapprove:
42.95% FAILED
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Please note that several of these amendments are either exactly
identical or essentially duplicative. If one of the amendments that failed,
but received a majority of the votes cast on the question, had passed,
subsequent amendments on that topic would have been unnecessary.
Therefore, while it is correct that Illinois would have adopted fifteen
amendments, not just eleven, under the lower standard, it is also true that
several of the amendments would have passed the first time and therefore
not have been proposed again. A more realistic assessment is that
Illinois would have voted upon fifteen or sixteen amendments and would
have adopted twelve or thirteen of them.
